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More Than Mere Majorities
Saul Levmore°
I. INTRODUCTION

Spontaneous law is less enamored with simple majorities than is much
of formal law, at least in appellate courts, legislatures, the electoral college,
and plebiscites, where simple majoritarianism is the common requirement
for action. In contrast, young children who are asked to vote on a name for
their athletic team are often observed entertaining numerous nominations
and then raising their hands as each nomination is called out-with no
apparent restriction on the number of times a given little hand may be
raised. The winner is the option that attracts the most votes. Experienced
adults are often startled when these young voters raise their hands repeatedly, each casting numerous ballots. But in fact, the practice can be
understood as a spontaneous example of approval voting.
Among other things, approval voting takes into account more than each
voter's first place vote, but it has some trouble measuring intensities.
Conventional single-ballot voting can capture more information about
intensities simply because it differentiates between each voter's first place
selection and all other available choices. There is something to be said for
the adult norm of one-vote-per-participant, at least when the task is to select
a single winner. But at the risk of skipping over too many intermediate
steps, it may be useful to describe the intergenerational voting difference in
three ways. First, the children's voting method normally reveals that there
is majority support, after a fashion, for more than one team name, while the
adults' voting method is likely to find no majority support for any one
alternative. Second, the children's method steers clear of any intensely
disliked alternative, while adult techniques aim affirmatively to satisfy the
greatest number of voters. Finally, the methods chosen by adults are often
less vulnerable to strategic behavior, which may be thought undesirable on
both fairness and efficiency grounds.
It is, however, often unclear which method favors the organized
strategist most. In approval voting, a voter might suggest to allies that they
feign disapproval of alternative A in order to elevate the standing of their
first choice, B. If voters who prefer A, but do not disapprove of B, behave

'William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am most grateful for
conversations with Henry Smith and with many faculty, students, and alumni at the
University of Utah College of Law, where I was fortunate to be the Leary Lecturer in
November 2000.
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sincerely rather than strategically, then B may win even though most voting
systems would and should lead to A rather than B. Young children are more
likely to vote sincerely, so that their spontaneous use of approval voting is
noteworthy. More experienced voters might signal one another as just
described, strategically withdraw a nomination, or simply form coalitions
and abide by sophisticated, well-crafted instructions. All these considerations, as we will see, help construct a case for plurality voting' in settings
where it has not been seen before.
II. PREFERENCES AND RIGHT ANSWERS
A. Condorcet Winners and PreferenceAggregation
In some settings, round robin or exhaustive pairwise competitions are
an attractive means of determining a winner. Even when no single option
enjoys the support of an absolute majority of voters, there may be an
alternative that is preferred over every other option in head-to-head
competition. Such a winner is called a Condorcet winner,2 and I will
proceed under the assumption that when there is such a winner, it should
and will be preferred. Put differently, when there is a Condorcet winner, it
is very difficult to make a case for an option other than this alternative.
But an important and sometimes fatal problem is that there is not
always a Condorcet winner, and the very process of searching for such a
winner exposes the presence of cycling. Imagine, for example, that voters,
in or out of a legislature, are considering a school voucher plan. There is no
absolute majority for the proposed plan of a $5,000 voucher for every
school-age child in the jurisdiction whose family income is less than
$30,000. We might imagine, however, that two-thirds of the voters prefer
these vouchers over no vouchers, and that two out of three voters prefer
vouchers for all school-age children over vouchers for only lower income
students. But it is also possible that two out of three voters prefer no

'Plurality voting describes a single round of voting in which each voter can cast a single
vote for any option. The winner is the alternative receiving the most votes. In circumstances
where only two options are available, plurality voting amounts to simple majoritarianism. But
plurality voting also permits numerous options, in which case the winner, or the "first-pastthe-post," has simply received the most first-place votes, where voters were not asked for
their second-or third-place choices and where it is possible that one or more losing options
would have defeated the pluralitywinner in direct, or"pairwise," competition. Put differently,
when there is a Condorcet winner, it is very difficult to make a case for an option other than
this alternative.
'Named after the eighteenth-century French mathematician.
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vouchers over the alternative of vouchers for all children.3 With such
cycling, the procedure or voting mechanismwill determine the outcome, and
there is no-indeed under certain inoffensive assumptions there can be
no-solution to this problem or incoherence.'
I have suggested elsewhere that societies might tend to avoid voter
dissatisfaction by suppressing evidence of the cycling preferences.5
Spontaneous law and common intuitions can be said to reflect this
observation. Thus, we do not generally hold round robins to determine
winners in sporting events, and we would not expect (even) adults to engage
in exhaustive pairwise competition in order to choose a name for a soccer
team or perhaps a restaurant to patronize for a group dinner. In these
settings, a Condorcet winner is unlikely, the search for a Condorcet winner
is likely to reveal cycling (as there always is in the absence of such a winner
or in a dead heat), and the revelation of cycling might cause despair or
frustration regarding the actual choice once it is made.
In these settings, experienced voters might avoid approval voting,
except perhaps in a very informal manner so as to avoid selecting a
Condorcet loser,6 because of a well-founded perception that it rewards
strategic voting.7 Approval voting is commonly used, after a fashion, where

3

We can label the three voters or groups ofvoters as 1,2 and 3. Imagine that l's ranking
is LNA, where L is vouchers for lower-income children, N is no vouchers, and A represents
vouchers for all students. If 2's ranking is ALN and 3's preference is NAL, then we have a
cycle where L>N (L defeats N because I and 3 prefer L over N), A>L (A defeats L because
2 and 3 prefer A over L), but (in intransitive fashion) N>A (N defeats A because I and 3
prefer N over A). It is relatively easy to imagine real voters having these disparate rankings.
Voter 2 seems to like vouchers, and the more the merrier. Voter I focuses on the wealth
distribution issue and likes vouchers only if they are limited to lower income users. Voter 3
shows us why cycling requires multiple spectra or non-single-peaked preferences. See
generally KENNETH A. SHBPSLE & MARKS. BONCHEK, ANALYziNG POLITICs: RATIONALITY,
BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS

84-91 (1997) (discussing single-peaked preferences). We can

explain Voter 2's preferences as reflecting either a concern about tainting lower-income
students or a disapproval of disparate treatment based on wealth.
4
Readers unfamiliar with these concepts might begin with SBEPSLE & BONCHEK, supra
note 3, at 39-81 and ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 17-49 (2000).
5
See Saul Levmore, ParliamentaryLaw, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting
Paradox,75 VA. L. REV. 971, 991-96 (1989) (explaining "unavoidable" and "avoidable"
voter dissatisfaction and noting historical parliamentary tendency to suppress cycling
problems).
6
'here is, after all, no reason to choose an option that loses to all competitors in
pairwise competition. Hence, there is reason to ask whether anyone really objects to option
A (where A is a team name or perhaps a movie that friends consider attending). A Condorcet
loser is likely to be some voter's least favorite choice, while other options will be no one's
least favorite.
7
Interested readers can see that asking voters to assign points across multiple choices
will not solve the problem of strategic voting. See infra Section IV.D.
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decisions are made based on audience applause-whether to kill gladiators
or request musical encores-and it is noteworthy that these decisions are
already framed as binary and thus there can be no cycling.
B. Right Answers, the Jury Theorem, and (Even) Plurality Voting
With rare exception, choosing the name of a team is a question of pure
preference aggregation. In other situations, however, there might well be a
right answer. In these cases, aggregation serves the function of pooling
information contained in the group of voters. Here, the case for simple
majority decisionmaking, as opposed to approval voting and many other
voting forms, is very strong. There is a famous theorem about this, which I
will refer to as the Jury Theorem.! Consider, for example, a group or jury
asked to vote on tort damages or a question of negligence. The law normally
structures the question as an up or down vote, suitable for majority or
supermajority rule. In this format, the power of group decisionmaking,
which is surprisingly straightforward, furthers the case for majority voting
on epistemic grounds. The gist of the Jury Theorem is that if we had
thousands of observers, each a bit more likely than not to be right, we would
do very well indeed to listen to a majority of them.9 If most voters are more
likely than not to be right, and we cannot identify those experts who are
much more likely to be right, then abiding by majority vote will produce the
correct answer more often than any other method, with the likelihood of
success increasing as the number of voters increases.
It is less obvious that, with some care, we can extend the Jury Theorem
cases
where there is a right answer and multiple options exist. With many
to
observers and more than two alternatives, the logic applied to the two-option
case can be extended to a decision with multiple options. Sometimes, it will
be sensible to abide by plurality voting-that is, go with the option that
garners the most votes. Thus, with four options and numerous voters who
(all or even mostly) have a greater than one in four chance of selecting the
correct answer, the group plurality vote is a good option.'" While the Jury
Theorem originally focused on the question of a defendant's guilt or
innocence, its insight is also useful for cases with no natural binary vote.
Therefore, participants interested in reaching the correct answer will also

8
This theorem is normally (also) attached to the Marquis de Condorcet's name, but I
think the jury idea is much more intuitive than the insoluble paradox bearing his name.
9
See DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 158-59 (discussing
Condorcet's work of 1785); Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REv. I t1,
142-47 (2000) (discussing Condorcet Jury Theorem).
1 am grateful for discussion with Robert Goodin on this subject.
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wish to follow a plurality rule where there are multiple options, so long as
the other assumptions are satisfied.
Anyone who has watched the popular television program Who Wants
to be a Millionaire" knows the value of group voting, majority acquiescence, and even plurality inclinations. Each contestant on the game show
has a one-time option of seeking advice from the studio audience. Clever
contestants resort to this "lifeline" precisely when they face a question
dealing with popular culture or some other matter where it is likely that
most audience members are not merely guessing or randomly selecting an
answer. The program allows respondents in the audience to indicate only
their first choices, although contestants might prefer that the audience have
the option of abstention (if there is reason to think that self-assessment
about knowledge levels is reliable) or, more to the point, the ability to rank
the available answers. If, for example, an audience responds 40-38-12-10
respectively to the four proffered choices, A, B, C, and D, a contestant
might do well to select B if all twenty-two presumptively incorrect voters
(who chose C or D) believe that B is more likely to be correct than A. 2 Put
slightly differently, incorrect voters as to the right answer might still be right
as to the response that is least likely to be correct, and so forth.
There are, of course, schemes that ask voters for their second and thirdplace choices, even where the aim of the vote seems to be to find the correct
answer and not to aggregate preferences. Votes by sportswriters for awards
given to most valuable players and awards voted on by the Motion Picture
Academy come to mind. Similarly, there are runoffs in many political
systems, but these multi-tiered voting processes may be driven more by
ideas about aggregating preferences than by the goal of finding correct
answers.
C. Mixed Questions and the Variety of Voting Rules
It may be tempting at this point, from both a positive and a normative
perspective, to ask first whether a given matter to be decided involves a
right answer or an attempt at preference aggregation. If the former, we might
expect Jury Theorem thinking to dominate, in which case numerous voters
and simple majorities are to be trusted. But, where preferences are at issue,
the focus might be on searching for a Condorcet winner. The problem,

"(ABC television broadcast, 2000).
' 2The actual program neither asks for rankings nor allows the contestant any follow-up
questions with the audience. The example in the text will be further explored to emphasize
that rankings provided by respondents who are wrong with their first choices may be more
useful in some settings than others. See infra notes 20, 29.
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however, is that most questions on which we vote involve a mixture of right
answers and preference aggregation. This is true for exercises in popular
democracy, legislative actions, and especially general elections, which are
perhaps the clearest instance of such mixing. Voters may respond to
preference questions such as "Which leader will favor the sort of welfare
policy that I prefer?" But voters will also respond to questions with right
answers, as in "Will one leader's tax plan cause the sort of business
investment this candidate promises?" There may be other types of questions
as well. a
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is enormous variety around the
democratic world with respect to how elected leaders and representatives
are selected. There is, perhaps, as much variety with respect to this aspect
of law or lawmaking as with any other. Roughly speaking, it might be said
that no two countries are alike in this regard, with scores of significantly
different approaches. Winner-take-all pluralities are common in the United
States, but it is easy to see why other jurisdictions deploy systems built
around proportional representation or use runoffs to achieve absolute
majorities and so forth) 4 In virtually every democracy, crises come in the
form of close elections, unshakable incumbents, instability, apparent
gridlock, or seemingly hyperactive government. This can, in turn, cause an
electorate, or at least its intellectual elite, to contemplate a switch to some
other voting scheme, even as another country with just that scheme ponders
a reverse switch.
Despite all the variety, there are several ways in which these systems
are uniform. Virtually all democracies have legislatures, and once the
elected representatives are inside the legislative assembly, they do not use
plurality voting, and they do not rank or assign weights or points to their
preferences (or assessments of right answers). Nor do they use proportional
voting to determine substantive policy. When a tax bill is passed along party
lines by a 2-1 margin, for example, we do not find proportional powersharing, such as two years of majority law for every one year of minority

3
In particular, there is the possibility that political candidates will compete for votes
and maximize their own well being once elected by offering exploitative plans or ideas for
externalizing costs. The voter is expected to ask whether a given candidate's plan will help
the voter at the expense of others. The more that legal systems do not check this dysfunction
of government, the more we might expect variety in the ways we choose lawmakers. But this
complexity is probably unnecessary to explain the remarkable variety found among
democratic systems for electing lawmakers.
'4 The U.S. electoral college may seem unusual, for example, until one realizes that only
a very few democracies use simple, direct election to choose their leaders. Some intermediation, geographic weighting, or runoff schemes are found in most places.
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law. Instead, the legislative rule is very much of the winner-take-all kind,
where the winner must obtain an absolute majority coalition.
The rule of decision in courts is slightly less universal. There is, once
again, enormous variety as to (judicial) appointment, election, and
promotion, but there is almost universal convergence on the requirement of
an absolute majority coalition for what I call "disposition," or the immediate, enforceable result affecting the litigants. The rule of decision is,
therefore, only interesting where the legal system calls for a panel ofludges,
as is normally the case on appeal and occasionally the case for fact-finding
and other initial judgments. If, for example, nine justices hear a case on
appeal, we might imagine rules allowing judgments to be entered if there is
support by a majority (5-4, for example), supermajority (such that a mere
five votes in favor of reversal would presumably fail and leave standing the
decision below), or plurality (4-3-2) judgments. There may be a designated
tiebreaker (following a 3-3-3 vote). In nearly all jurisdictions, the court must
at least reach a simple majority decision. But this rule or norm applies only
to dispositions-the judges are free to write opinions giving their reasoning,
and in many jurisdictions (and certainly in the United States), plurality
decisions based on different reasoning are common. I dwell on this
disposition/reasoning distinction' 5-not to mention the very meaning of a
split opinion-later, but first it is useful to deal with (and set aside) the
supermajoritarian possibility.
D. Supermajorities
The supermajority alternative raises the obvious question of why we
see supermajority requirements in some settings and not others. Civil juries,
constitutional conventions, treaty ratifications, and local bond referenda
would not seem to have much in common, yet supermajorities are well
known in all these settings.
Supermaj orityrequirements are not easily defended or explained by the
rationale that they raise the level of confidence in decisionmaking or
convince more participants as to a decision's importance. To the extent a
group searches for a right answer, even a sizeable minority should (as we
have seen) be pleased to abide by a simple majority-and sometimes even
by a plurality-assessment. In these settings, the voice of the majority is
ignored at the risk of passing up perfectly correct decisions. And where a
matter of preference aggregation is concerned, a supermaj ority requirement
'Sl try to explain the distinction in Saul Levmore, Ruling Majoritiesand Reasoning
Pluralities,in THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW: 5th Issue: Economic Analysis of Constitutional Law (forthcoming January 2002) (manuscript at 7-12, on file with author).
HeinOnline -- 2000 Utah L. Rev. 765 2000

766

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2000:759

hardly eliminates cycling, and it can eliminate a Condorcet winner where
one exists.
Supermajorities are likely best explained on a case-by-case basis. For
instance, they are often used to limit the imposition of external costs. Voters
might fear that majorities will allow governments to grow in order to take
inefficient or purely redistributive actions at the expense of either a minority
or a poorly organized majority. In the long run, however, even efficient
interventions may prove inefficient once rent-seeking costs are taken into
account.' 6 We normally think of citizens or constitutional framers as
guarding against the externality problem by imposing, for example,
precommitments as to compensation for losers or provisions that some
subjects are ultra vires for the government. But another such tool is the
supermajority vote, even though it comes at the expense of giving holdout
power to minorities and blocking some Condorcet winning alternatives.
Other supernajorities are explained in a more localized fashion. Thus,
we might explain a supermajority requirement with respect to referenda
regarding local bond issues as responding to the fear that some proposed
public projects will favor the organized few, who go to the polls when
"their" projects are at issue, over the silent taxpayers. Another intuitive,
subject-specific explanation applies to juries. We might expect civil juries
to be governed by a simple majority rule, if only because we ask these jurors
to find right answers, and the Jury Theorem tells us that simple majoritarianism is the best rule. Burden of proof considerations might suggest that a
plaintiff should lose if the plaintiff's case cannot attract a supermajority, but
the fact that we regard close decisions with disfavor is surely puzzling. A
unanimous jury of members, each barely more likely than not to get a matter
right, obviously has a much higher likelihood of being right than a closely
divided jury,"7 but it is not as if the divided jury's minority is more likely to
be right than its majority. A key argument for supermajoritaianism in this
context is probably based on the rather unexciting idea that a simple
majority rule might allow juries to rush to judgment after taking an initial
straw ballot."8 However, this view is alleviated in some jurisdictions, where
a simple majority decision becomes acceptable only after deliberation has
61refer to the costs expended in orderto encourage or discourage governmental action.
See COOTER, supra note 4, at 68-75 (explaining rent-seeking costs).
"7See Saul Levmore, Conjunction andAggregation,99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001); see
also Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen, CondorcetModels, AvenuesforFutureResearch,
in 2 INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 93,98 (Bernard
Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986) (suggesting unanimity requirement to increase group
accuracy).
"8 See Levmore, supra note 15, manuscript at 26.
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occurred for a certain amount of time." The simple majority approach is
further supported by the observation that panels of arbitrators normally
operate by majority vote. It would seem senseless to force a panel of
arbitrators to reach a unanimous decision, and we certainly do not expect
private parties to agree ex ante to be bound only by unanimous arbitration
panels.
In other settings, we can explain supermajoritarianism as the cost of an
initial pooling arrangement, perhaps as a device to prevent the imposition
of certain external costs. For example, sovereign states may agree to enter
a union only if there is some supermajority constraint on the ability of the
whole to interfere with the will of a part. Citizens of these parts may simply
distrust the preferences of other members, prefer to retain control over many
things themselves, or fear that a mere majority will impose taxes, obligations, or regulations that overburden their own kind. There are several ways
to guard against these problems, but a supermajorityrule is fairly simple and
perhaps especially attractive where each member state recognizes that, even
ifthe union misses some Condorcet winners, the member state can continue
to pass desirable legislation on its own.20
III. DIVIDED COURTS

A. Narrowest Grounds andDiscerningMajority Reasoning
I turn now to voting on judicial panels. Imagine an appellate court,
perhaps the United States Supreme Court, splitting 4-2-3. We have already
seen that we demand a majority for disposition, yet, we tolerate splits as to
reasoning and, therefore, the stated precedential value of a case. The current
American norm, though not quite the universal practice,' is to abide by the

'"For this and some further discussion ofjury deliberation, see id., manuscript at 19
n.33.

2°This argument is an extension of Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When are Two

DecisionsBetter than One?, 12 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 145, 155-59 (1992) (comparing
supermajoritarianism with bicameralism).
21
My focus is on judicial panels, although the analysis is the same for administrative
panels, commissions, military tribunals, and so forth. In part IV, I return to legislative
chambers.
'Some federal courts still follow old practice and derive no precedential value from
these split decisions. See, e.g., Wiesenfeld v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 367 F. Supp.
981, 988 (D.N.J. 1973) ("While a decision by a divided Court is as final on all issues of the
case as a decision by a unanimous court the reasoning employed by a plurality does not
become law."). Many state courts also regard pluralities as incapable of producing precedent.
See, e.g., Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Mich. 1976) ("Plurality decisions in which
no majority of the justices participating agree as to the reasoning are not an authoritative
HeinOnline -- 2000 Utah L. Rev. 767 2000
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narrowest-majority-grounds rule, also known as the Marks doctrine,' in
interpreting such a divided court. If the groups of Four and Two (or any
other coalition) agree on a disposition ofthe case, with the Three dissenting,
then we have a clear disposition; the precedential impact, or reasoning, is
then that of the Four or Two, depending on which is deemed narrower, or
more likely to be agreeable to the other subgroup found in the majority
coalition. If, for example, the majority affirms an opinion that finds a statute
unconstitutional, the narrower grounds are normally said to be that
reasoning that would invalidate the fewest other statutes. However,
examples must be investigated one at a time. A possibility that does not
seem to occur to many judges is that of no narrowest grounds. Thus, while
we might say the narrowest-majority-grounds rule asks us to look for a
Condorcet winner, we are left with the possibility of a case that has split a
court because there is simply no Condorcet winner with regard to the
reasoning. Note, in passing, that we do not ask our courts for a supermajority decision-and this may be explained or justified by the idea that we like
to think these courts look for right answers rather than preference satisfaction.
B. Misconstruingand Falsely Construing (Judicial)Majorities
By way of example, imagine a statute providing that contingency fees
charged by lawyers may not exceed twenty percent of the judgment or
settlement received by a client/plaintiff. Imagine further, a suit, brought by
an unsuccessful plaintiff or attorney, challenging the statute. Following a
loss at trial, the plaintiff appeals to a panel ofnine judges. Four judges ("the
Four") vote to strike the statute and reverse the lower court, reasoning that
the cap would discourage meritorious suits and therefore violate the right to
Due Process. Two judges ("the Two") agree on a reversal, saying that the
statute unfairly interferes with freedom of contract. Finally, three judges
("the Three") vote to affirm the lower court, with these judges arguing that

interpretation binding on this Court under the doctrine ofstaredecisis."); Commonwealth v.
Cooper, 278 A.2d 895, 897 (Pa. 1971) (holding that decision supported by only three state
supreme court judges cannot, under Pennsylvania law, be considered controlling precedent);
But see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 694 (3d
Cir. 1991) (stating that narrowest-ground is as binding on lower courts as nine-justice
opinion).
"Following the decision in Marks v. UnitedStates, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds,"' (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976))).
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the legislature ought to be afforded wide latitude. The lower court is of
course reversed, and the statute invalidated, because there is a (6-3) majority
for this disposition.
It is possible that a related matter will arise before a subsequent court,
which raises questions concerning the precedent set out by the earlier court.
The later court might say that the narrowest-grounds doctrine points to the
reasoning set out by the Four because that line of argument will lead to the
fewest invalidations of statutes. Indeed, it is plausible that the Two's
freedom of contract argument would, if treated as binding authority, cause
the invalidation of a large number of price regulations and associated
statutes. But of course, this interpretation in favor of the Four's reasoning
might misconstrue the Four-plus-Two majority coalition (as to disposition).
The Four might in fact agree with the Two about freedom of contract, but
the Two might not share the Four's view of Due process or of the likely
effect of the statutory cap on the mix of meritorious and frivolous suits.
Perhaps the Two do not think that Due Process has much to do with the
number of suits a legal rule encourages, or perhaps they simply disagree
with the implicit empirical claim about discouraged lawsuits. This is not to
say that the later, interpreting court would do better deciding that the
reasoning of the Two is the narrowest ground it seeks to identify. It is even
easier to see that the Four might not agree with the Two; the latter's
reasoning will, after all, invalidate more statutes, and all things equal, this
seems like an error to be avoided. One question is whether such errors are
avoidable; another is whether there are yet other types of errors to be
avoided.
The subsequent, interpreting court, not to mention parties who plan
their affairs and hope to predict judicial sentiment, might also falsely
construe the narrowest-grounds majority because there is, in fact, no stable
winner. Consider, for example, that the Two might rank the three identified
reasoning options as F-L-D, where F is the freedom of contract argument,
L is the legislative leeway notion, and D is the Due process argument
against the cap for fear of discouraging meritorious lawsuits. Meanwhile,
the four might rank the options as D-F-L, preferring to strike everything that
discourages meritorious suits before supporting the freedom of contract
argument. And the Three might rank the options as L-D-F, wishing most to
leave state regulation alone, but otherwise more concerned about the risk of
discouraging good suits than with freedom of contract. With these rankings,
there is no narrowest reasoning, and any interpretation or attempt to apply
the Marks rule chases a false hope.
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C. Abiding by JudicialPluralities
But I am not simply emphasizing that the Marks rule must be used with
care and that there is the risk of misconstruction and false construction (as
I have labeled these problems) when interpreting a split vote. A more novel
alternative is that whether or not there is either a true narrowest majority
(supporting one line of reasoning in support of the majority's disposition)
or cycling (and therefore no reasoning majority to be found) perhaps we
should favor the reasoning of the Four, as a plurality, because of the Jury
Theorem. This argument in favor of the method most likely to find the right
answer is not entirely fanciful. These judges are lawyers, after all, and they
may be significantly more likely than not to be right about the question of
whether the statute will discourage meritorious suits. Put differently, it is
curious, and perhaps misguided, to look for the narrowest grounds when this
is most readily translated into a quest for a Condorcet winner. The
Condorcet winner argument is strongest where preference aggregation is at
stake, but judges normally think of themselves as in the business of finding
right answers rather than satisfying or aggregating preferences. Where there
is a right answer to be found, there is a decent case for abiding by the
plurality, even though a different option may be able to win all its pairwise
competitions. There is, to be sure, an argument for asking a large group to
make pairwise evaluations, but in cases where an incorrect voter is unlikely
to be any good with his or her other rankings, the plurality is superior to the
option that looks like a Condorcet winner.24 In any event, the best strategy,
in lieu of the plurality, is probably to ask all the judges-dissenters
included-to compare the two (or more) arguments supporting the majority
disposition. This is not what the Marks doctrine does; by looking for the
narrowest grounds in support of the majority, it excludes (and certainly does
not ask for) information about the dissenters' views as to which of the
majority-supporting grounds is "right."
The potential for plurality voting, at least as to reasoning, is more
dramatic but on shakier ground when the plurality is in dissent. Imagine that
the Two and the Three form a majority for a given disposition, and that the
Four dissent, presumably as to disposition as well as to reasoning. It is
possible that the reasoning of the Two, or of the Three, is indeed an

2

The game-show analogue is to consider a situation where the studio audience is
divided 40-30-20-1 0 among four options. Imagine that the question asks for the square root
of 3 with suggested answers (a) 1.732 (b) 1.414 (c) 3.143, and (d) 4. In this situation, those
who choose (c) or (d) seem sufficiently clueless or easily distracted such that a contestant,
who cannot do the calculation on the spot, should probably attach little significance to their
votes as between (a) and (b).
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appropriate narrow ground, such that all five voters in the majority would
agree on the particular reasoning. But again, it is also possible that cycling
would occur or that we would misconstrue the direction of likely agreement
within the Two-plus-Three group. Here, the Jury Theorem approach gives
some pause. The straightforward thing to do would be to go with the
reasoning of the Three because this group is sightly more likely to be right
than the Two. But why not trust the Four? This plurality offers our best
hope for getting the matter right, and yet there is the annoying problem that
they constitute the dissent. My own inclination is to do as some jurisdictions
do in all split cases and declare that the case has no precedential value at
all.25 In any event, the easier claim is that given a disposition favored by a
Four-plus-Three, a Four-plus-Two, or a Four-plus-One coalition, the Jury
Theorem makes a strong case for allowing the Four to determine the
precedential value. This is true even where a later interpreter perceives a
narrower ground within the smaller subgroup.
In short, when a panel is divided such that there is no simple majority
for any line ofreasoning, there may be noncycling preferences that are hard
to discern, there may be cycling among preferences, and there may not be
preferences at all, but rather a right answer before us. In these circumstances, there is a good argument to be made for plurality decisionmaking.
Typically, but not necessarily, this plurality will be a group of four on a
panel of nine, or a group of three on a panel of seven.26
IV. PLURALITY VOTING OUTSIDE THE JUDICIARY

A. Legislative Pluralities
I have suggested that we allow pluralitarianism some room to grow. As
implied by the opening example in this Lecture, pluralities are common in
informal settings, and there is often something to be learned from private,
spontaneous arrangements. It is interesting that informal law avoids the very
decision methods that formal law converges upon. Thus, it is extremely rare
to find an insistence on majority (rather than plurality) disposition or
motion-and-amendment voting27 anywhere other than in judicial chambers,
25See supra note 22.

"6When there is a panel of three, the plurality and simple majority are the same and
construction problems cannot be avoided by following the plurality, as the division with
respect to reasoning will be 1-1-1.
27
The expression refers to up or down voting, normally by simple majority, so that the
status quo is favored until some alternative musters majority support. A parliamentary rule
system might be chosen in advance in order to control the process of perfecting the proposal
that is before the group. If there are three options, A, B, and C, someone might move the
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groups that follow parliamentary law, and other continuing, formal
organizations.
On the other hand, we do use plurality voting in some formal settings.
It is significant, and completely unsurprising, that pluralities determine the
winner in each presidential primary-although other candidates may be
awarded delegates because these are not necessarily winner-take-all
competitions. Note the presence of five features. Pairwise competition
would be unwieldy because there are multiple options and dispersed voters.
Second, a Condorcet winner is also unlikely to be present, so the very
advantage of pairwise competition is absent. Third, the question for the
voters involves a mix of preferences and right answers; the right answers
extend not only to policy matters, but also to the question (with a right
answer) of who can win in the general election. Fourth, there are numerous
voters (as well as options) so that strategic voting is difficult. Finally, in an
important sense, no single vote is final; votes are open to future interpretation, much like a judicial panel's reasoning, as opposed to its disposition.
In the case of primary elections, the future interpreters are the voters in
other states' primaries and the candidates themselves, who can withdraw
and support running mates.
Legislative decisionmaking is an area where pluralitarianism has
untapped potential. The motion-and-amendment method allows the
committees and the chair, speaker, or other officer to control the agenda and
often determine the order or pattern in which pairs of options are compared
by vote. If there is a Condorcet winner, this can be quite efficient, with the
Condorcet winner appearing one way or the other unless the chair has the
power to rule this alternative out of order or otherwise to prevent its
consideration. But if there is cycling (and no Condorcet winner), then the
power to control procedure is critical, and the result is not so much
democratic-except that the group may have selected the chair-as
dictatorial and ripe for rent seeking.28
By way of comparison, plurality voting in the legislature can generate
the advantage promised by the Jury Theorem, at least where the body
considers something with a right answer. And where preferences are at
stake, plurality voting avoids pairwise competition-and thus avoids

passage of A, in which case those who prefer B or C need to decide whether to support A or
hope for something better if A is defeated. Generally speaking, a supermajority hurdle
prevents the ready reconsideration of A once it loses. See generally Levmore, supra note 5,
at 989-90 (outlining reconsideration rules in parliamentary procedure).
2
Rent seeking refers to the fact that interest groups and other parties will try to
influence the outcome, in this case by influencing the chair. The process of seeking this
influence can itself be wasteful, not to mention undemocratic.
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delegation of power to the chair or other agenda setter. Plurality voting does
present the danger of strategic coalitions by voters, but at least these
coalitions can be overturned by future legislatures when there is dissatisfaction with the earlier results.
B. Pluralitiesand Single Subjects: The SeparationDilemma
Return, for illustrative purposes, to our earlier voucher example, where
there was cycling among the alternatives of no vouchers, vouchers for
lower-income students, and vouchers for all students. That question was
typical in that it involved an inexorable mix of right answers and preferences. Motion-and-amendment voting will find a Condorcet winner if one
exists, while plurality voting might well miss it. But it may be more useful
to focus on the question of when to allow the piling on of additional
alternatives (which can increase the chance of cycling, but also perhaps,
reveal a desirable Condorcet-winner option) and when to separate decisions
that may or may not be intertwined. In the voucher case, for example, the
number of options can quicklybe expanded by introducing different funding
levels (that is, vary the value of the voucher), conditions on recipient
families and schools, and varying terms for the program as a whole. The
question is whether to vote on these matters separately; both separation and
the introduction of additional options can be used as strategic tools.
If, for example, one group moves to require that any voucher plan be
funded annually at a level yielding $15,000 (or, alternatively, $1,000) per
student, this may encourage votes for (or against) the no-voucher alternative. If the two voucher options can be endlessly subdivided as different
dollar amounts (or other conditions) are attached, the likelihood of finding
a putative Condorcet winner drops and the power of organized groups and
strategic voting coalitions grows. Even so, I think it plausible that the more
we think there is no Condorcet winner, the more plurality voting may offer
a useful alternative, both because it can capture information from the group
(Jury Theorem style) and weaken the power of the chair or other agendasetter.29
The idea of separation, or division, of some issues for a series of votes
is itself an interesting area for further exploration. The strategic value of
separation may be minimized with a rule that, if one party moves to separate
out issues, an opposing party may decide the order in which the voters
consider them. Either way, at some level of abstraction, separation is
29

But I do not attempt to prove this proposition here. For the present, I aim only to offer
the idea that plurality voting may be superior to the legislative decisionmaking rules we
know.
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inevitable, as known by readers familiar with single-subject requirements.3 0
Any proposal for plurality voting is therefore really a suggestion for some
hybrid of plurality and motion-and-amendment, or limited pairwise, voting.
Put differently, the importance of framing means that most issues can be
broken down into questions to be decided with a mix of binary and plurality
choices. Consider, for instance, a legislature trying to decide whether to
store certain toxic wastes at sites in Kansas, West Virginia, or Colorado.
Imagine a 40-30-30 division within this legislature, which is empowered by
its own rules to switch to, or otherwise engage in, plurality voting. The Jury
Theorem tempts us to think that the right answer is Kansas. But it is
possible that if we framed the question as whether, given testimony about
chemical breakdowns, the toxins should be stored in a mountainous region,
there might well be a 60-40 affirmative vote. Indeed, the mountainnonmountain choice might be a purer Jury Theorem sort of question than the
about specific states, where preferences and other variables loom
question
larger.33'
C. Pluralitiesfor Plebiscites
Plurality voting might be an especially useful innovation with respect
to large-scale referenda or other plebiscites. Consider any of a number of
modem peace proposals, offered to voters in a region, country, or pair of
neighboring countries, either for ratification or nonbinding "advice" to
political leaders. The more we insist (as does current practice) on a single
proposal with an up or down vote, the more power is given to the drafters
3

In a state with a single-subject constraint on legislation or initiatives, logrolling is
(allegedly) constrained by a prohibition on bills or propositions with unrelated subjects. Of
course, there is room for interpretation as to when subjects are related, or germane. Thus, we
can expect courts to permit legislatures to enact budget bills with (arguably) many subjects
because fiscal constraints often put all spending and taxing into one subject. For an example
ofcourt flexibility, see Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. StateBd. OfEqualization,806 P.2d 1360,
1366 (Cal. 1991) (concluding that tobacco-related bill is valid, even where some of its
spending measures are not directly tobacco-related). The point in the text is that, in some
sense, all law is intertwined so that votes can always be dependent on the results of other
votes, and yet there must be some order to the voting or one omnibus piece of law. I leave this
problem for another day.
31
Again, I do not intend to resolve this matter here, but rather claim to suggest the
nature of a future inquiry. There may be no neutral principle to control the separation
question. As such, plurality voting does not, on its own, solve the problem of agenda-setting
power. An agenda-setter might do just as well in control of the "procedural" question of
germaneness, or in control of when to allow issues to be separated out for independent votes.
At the same time, plurality voting might provide for incremental improvement, both in terms
of removing power from the agenda-setter and capturing information held by numerous
voters.
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who can vary the terms because of their first-mover advantage. Moreover,
such a proposal, even when formally ratified, generally requires future
interpretation by political representatives and other parties. Finally, these
voters are numerous, dispersed, and not easily organized to vote strategically. All these factors suggest the utility of plurality voting where voters
might be offered four or five options and the opportunity to choose among
them.
D. On Ranking Schemes
I' have tried, thus far, to set aside the possibility of going beyond
plurality voting, following the first-past-the-post style, to permit either
proportional results in some cases or ranking systems in others. In the peace
proposal context, for instance, there is obviously a case to be made for
offering voters the opportunity to rank the options, or at least indicate their
judgments beyond the question of first choice. But the opportunity to rank
or assign weights also creates the possibility that strategic coalitions may be
formed to undercut sensible preference aggregation.32 An organized group
might advise its members to rank the favored option first, but then to give
an artificially low ranking to a threatening alternative. In contrast, plurality
voting-though also vulnerable to strategic voting-requires the strategist
to convince adherents to cast their only vote for something other than their
first choice. I suspect this is much harder to accomplish.
This intuition about strategic cooperation is reflected in the fact that we
find ranking, in the form of point systems, only very rarely in political
elections, and yet often for such things as awarding prizes in Olympic
competition. Athletic performances are particularly well suited to voting-byranking because of several features. First, they are perceived as (ideally)
involving right answers and not preferences. As we have seen, there is a
case to be made that the pairwise assessments of informed voters, in
collective pursuit of a right answer, can sometimes be useful, even if they
are "wrong" regarding first choices.33 We might be interested in a judge's

32

In princip'e, if voters recognize that "right answers," rather than preferences, are at
issue, they will not be tempted to behave strategically because they should appreciate the
value of group decisionmaking along the lines of the Jury Theorem.
3
An earlier example, see supra note 24, offered a situation where incorrect voters
appeared uninformed and therefore useless inJury Theorem terms with respect to the task of
finding the correct answer as between the two leading choices. But imagine now the question
as: Which city is the greatest distance from New York? (a) Miami, Florida; (b) Topeka,
Kansas; (c) Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; or (d) New Orleans, Louisiana. The audience is
consulted and is split 25-13-30-32. The contestant might sensibly wish that the rules
permitted asking those who favored (b), or (a) and (b), to help decide. Topeka is not an
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comparison of skaters C and D, even if this judge is the only one to have put
skater F ahead of C and D. Second, ranking systems are more attractive the
more we can control strategic misassessments. It is common for judges in
the skating arena, for instance, to jettison outliers. In other settings, such as
voting for the most valuable player awards in certain sports, the publication
of votes may serve to control strategic rankings. 4 Finally, ranking is
especially convenient when we seek to determine multiple prizes, as we do
in Olympic competition, but not in most primaries or plebiscites. All three
of these considerations suggest that ranking systems may do more harm than
good-and that they do not dominate simple plurality voting-in most
voting situations.
V. CONCLUSION

It is sometimes wise to give up the quest for a Condorcet winner
because we can discern that no Condorcet winner is likely to be present,
because the quest itself comes at the cost of over-delegation to agendasetters, or because the situation is one with a right answer and so that there
is a superior way-plurality voting-to find this answer. In these situations,
conventional legislative procedures and party politics associated with largescale elections provide the appearance ofmajoritarianism. One cost of this
majoritarianism is the exclusion of many alternatives from consideration. I
have suggested, albeit rather implicitly, that to the extent we have faith in
political authorities, we may be better off allowing them to construe
pluralities, knowing they can be held accountable for their interpretations
of divided votes.
This Lecture began with some thoughts about how we might link the
manner of voting to the question of whether the matter at issue involves a
right answer or preference aggregation. Of course, we recognize that most
absurd answer, nor a mere guess, as far as the contestant can tell. It is simply unlikely to be
correct given the Jury Theorem strategy. The contestant needs help to see that Oklahoma City
is, in fact, far enough west to make it the correct answer.
34
Consider "voting" in response to surveys aimed at eliciting "reputation" scores used
for ranking law schools. The dean, faculty member, or even alumnus of law school Y might
be tempted to rank Y in the first quintile, but place law school H or C in the second quintile
in order to make Y look better when the scores are combined. The central authority might
have a policy of eliminating a given ballot if only a small percentage of voters have agreed
with the ballot-marker's assessment of his or her own school, or evaluation of competitors'
schools. Our strategic voter may have declined to bump H down to the lowest quintile,
precisely to avoid the likely strategy of disqualifying extreme outliers. Note that rankings are
useful here because the central authority or compiler seeks to award more than a single prize.
Note also that we seek a "right answer" but fear the presence of obvious preferences for
winning.
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of us are unable to separate situations with right answers from those where
we simply have strongly or weakly held preferences. If the goals of getting
things right and satisfying our preferences (or aggregating them) could be
separated, then when the right answers were at stake, we might try to learn
to be good losers, taking comfort in the power of a large group to get things
right. My suggestion has been that when preferences and correctness are
hopelessly intertwined, we might nevertheless be more receptive to plurality
rule. However, even this conclusion requires that we have some faith in the
group's ability to get things right, which in turn requires some confidence
in such things as the educational system. We tend to associate passion for
politics with civic virtue of a sort, but, at some point, equal respect for
others and recognition of group power suggest that losing is better than it is
cracked up to be.
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